Argument from Semantic Determinacy

James F. Ross gives an argument that thinking must be a non-physical process because concepts are semantically determinate, whereas no physical thing is determinate.

NOTES

Argument from Semantic Determinacy of Thought

1. There is a fact of the matter about what concepts mean
2. There is no fact of the matter about what anything physical means
3. So, concepts are not physical

• O1: our thoughts aren't determinate
  • R1: self-defeating
• O2 (Peter Dillard): in computer science, there is a determinate difference between an and-gate, an or-gate
  • R1: physically determinate, not semantically determinate
• O3: neuroscience shows connection between thought and brain
  • R1: the physical is necessary, but not sufficient, for thought

Further Reading

Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind" by James Madden

Edward Feser, “Kripke, Ross, and the Immaterial Aspects of Thought," https://www.newdualism.org/papers/E.Feser/Feser-acpq_2013.pdf follow up blog post: https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2017/01/revisiting-ross-on-immateriality-of.html