The Intentionality Argument

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The Intentionality Argument
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Our thoughts are about things, a property we call intentionality. Material objects do not exhibit intentionality. In this video, I consider the possibility that this shows our minds are immaterial.

NOTES

THE INTENTIONALITY ARGUMENT

  1. Thoughts have intentionality
  2. Material things don't have intentionality
  3. So, thoughts are not material things
  • O1: causal view of intentionality
    • R1: non-existent causes (e.g., unicorn)
      • O1: these are just existent causes mixed together (e.g., unicorn = horn + horse)
        • R1: the concept may be caused by existent causes, but the content of the thought isn't of those existent causes
    • R2: different causes, same content
    • R3: same cause, different content
    • R4: reducing intentionality to an object ipso facto loses the 'aboutness' necessary for intentionality
  • O2 (Dennett): intentionality has no explanatory power so we shouldn't posit it
    • R1: it isn't something posited to explain, but something observed and in need of explaining

Further Reading

Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind, James D. Madden